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Reconsidering Reconciliation:
The Long Game
Jeffery G. Hewitt*

I. INTRODUCTION
Chief Justice McLachlin has identified reconciliation of the
relationship between Canada and Aboriginal people as among the Court’s
top priorities in the coming years,1 but has the Court prepared the way?
Since the meaning of section 35, Constitution Act, 1982,2 continues to
take shape and is central to reconciling the relationship between Canada
and Aboriginal people, what do we mean by reconciliation?3 This paper
explores some of the ways that Indigenous legal orders may offer
assistance to the priority of reconciliation, not only in terms of
potentially resolving issues within Aboriginal communities but also in
terms of regulating relationships between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal

*
This paper was prepared for the 17th Annual Constitution Cases Conference held at
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, on April 11, 2014 and relates to broader
questions relating to the legal relationship between Canada and Aboriginal people that I have been
exploring since my arrival at law school in 1993. Conceptualizing reconciliation as founded on
“equality of all peoples” as set out in the abstract and echoed throughout this paper, is based on
Professor Patrick Macklem’s thesis in Indigenous Difference and the Constitution of Canada
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001). There are many people to thank for their review of
early drafts of this paper and for their wise counsel. They are Professors Sonia Lawrence, Amar
Bhatia, Dayna Scott, Bruce Ryder, John Borrows and the anonymous peer reviewers. I am also
grateful for time spent as a McMurtry Fellow at Osgoode Hall Law School in 2013-2014 and being
able to spend time with a faculty who has been so intellectually generous with me.
1
See Joseph Brean, “‘Reconciliation’ with First Nations, not the Charter of Rights &
Freedoms, will define the Supreme Court in coming years, Chief Justice says” National Post (March 13,
2014), online: <http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/03/13/reconciliation-with-first-nations-not-thecharter-of-rights-freedoms-will-define-the-supreme-court-in-coming-years-chief-justice-says/>.
2
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Constitution”].
3
Both D. Newman, in “Reconciliation: Legal Conception(s) and Faces of Justice” in J.D.
Whyte, ed., Moving Toward Justice: Legal Traditions and Aboriginal Justice (Saskatoon: Purich
Publishing, 2008) [hereinafter “Newman”]; and T. Penikett, Reconciliation: First Nations Treaty
Making in British Columbia (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 2006) offer further insight into the
question of reconciliation of Aboriginal people and the settler population within a Canadian legal
framework.
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communities. This paper also seeks to draw links between section 35(1)
jurisprudence and Indigenous legal traditions based on a collection of
scholarship reflecting on both the former and the latter.
Though the word “reconciliation” is possessed of various definitions,
uses and meanings,4 this paper considers Professor Mark Walters’
reconciliation as a relationship, which “involves sincere acts of mutual
respect, tolerance and goodwill that serve to heal rifts and create the
foundations for a harmonious relationship”,5 as the most hopeful vision
of possibilities for Canada and Aboriginal people. Walters’ description of
reconciliation as relationship6 assists in nuancing the broadly accepted
technical legal definition of reconciliation “as the renewal of amicable
relations between two persons who had been at enmity or variance; usually
implying forgiveness of injuries on one or both sides”.7 In other words,
reconciliation goes beyond reconciling Aboriginal title or Aboriginal
economic interests with those of Canada and private enterprise.8
Reconciliation is a means to bring balance to the relationship between
Canada and Aboriginal people, which is too one-sided and has been tense
for centuries.9 Given this, the road to reconciliation is a delicate one and
must go beyond the merely symbolic.
At the heart of the tension is the Crown’s insistence that it is sovereign
over Aboriginal people.10 Indeed, since the passing of the Constitution
Act, 1982, while the Court has made room for an “unprecedented degree of
protection for certain ‘cultural’ practices within the state, it has
nonetheless repeatedly and steadfastly refused to challenge the racist
origin of Canada’s assumed sovereign authority over Indigenous peoples
4
V. Napoleon, “Who Gets to Say What Happened: Reconciliation Issues for the Gitxsan”
in C. Bell & D. Kahane, eds., Intercultural Dispute Resolution in Aboriginal Contexts (Vancouver:
UBC Press, 2004).
5
M. Walters, “The Jurisprudence of Reconciliation: Aboriginal Rights in Canada” in
W. Kymlicka & B. Bashir, eds., The Politics of Reconciliation in Multicultural Societies (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2008), Ch. 8, 165, at 170 [hereinafter “Walters”].
6
Id.
7
Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th ed. (St. Paul, MN: Thomson Reuters, 2009).
8
E. Ria Tzimas, “To What End the Dialogue?” in J. Cameron & B. Ryder, eds. (2011) 54
S.C.L.R. (2d) 493, at 514 [hereinafter “Tzimas”], sets out concerns relating to the Crown’s framing
of “reconciliation” as discussions merely addressing the negotiations of resource sharing or impact
benefit agreement.
9
For a discussion on the tension in the relationship between the Constitution and
Aboriginal people, see J. Borrows, “(Ab)Originalism and Canada’s Constitution” in J. Cameron & S.
Lawrence, eds. (2012) 58 S.C.L.R. (2d) 351 [hereinafter “Borrows, ‘(Ab)Originalism’”].
10
K. McNeil, “The Meaning of Aboriginal Title” in M. Asch, ed., Aboriginal and Treaty
Rights in Canada: Essays on Law, Equality, and Respect for Difference (Vancouver: UBC Press,
1997) 135, at 137 [hereinafter “Asch”].
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and their territories”.11 Yet, the mere introduction of European-based
laws did not supersede Aboriginal laws.12 Aboriginal people neither lost
nor surrendered their right to continue to develop and maintain their own
laws.13 Put another way, Aboriginal people have never been conquered.14
Nonetheless, the Crown has assumed sovereign authority over Aboriginal
people by means of historical fiction,15 which in some instances has been
propped up by the Court.16 Given this difference of opinion between the
Crown and Aboriginal people, is the Court able to utilize section 35 to
achieve reconciliation? How is reconciliation to be guided by a Court
that relies on laws that belong only to one party, and that are based on a
colonial construct?

11
G.S. Coulthard, “Subjects of Empire: Indigenous Peoples and the ‘Politics of Recognition
in Canada” (2007) 6:4 Contemporary Political Theory 437, at 451.
12
Connolly v. Woolrich, [1867] C.C.S. No. 32, 17 R.J.R.Q 75; Casimel v. Insurance Corp.
of British Columbia, [1993] B.C.J. No. 1834, 106 D.L.R. (4th) 720 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Van der Peet,
[1996] S.C.J. No. 77, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, at paras. 38-40 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Van der Peet”];
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] S.C.J. No. 108, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, at paras. 146-148
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Delgamuukw”] Mitchell v. Canada (M.N.R.), [2001] S.C.J. No. 33, [2001] 1
S.C.R. 911, at paras. 9-10, 61-64, 141-154 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mitchell”]. In addition, by
“Aboriginal laws” I refer to the body of laws developed and maintained by Aboriginal peoples
themselves not the body of law that is too frequently referred to as “Aboriginal law” meaning
Canadian law as it applies to Aboriginal people.
13
B. Slattery, “The Generative Structure of Aboriginal Rights” (2007) 38 S.C.L.R (2d) 595
[hereinafter “Slattery, ‘Generative Structure’”].
14
For an in-depth discussion on the meaning of sovereignty and Indigenous
conceptualizations, see T. Alfred, “Sovereignty” in Joanne Barker, ed., Sovereignty Matters:
Locations of Contestation and Possibility in Indigenous Struggles for Self-Determination (Lincoln,
NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2006) 33.
15
J. Borrows, “Wampum at Niagara: The Royal Proclamation, Canadian Legal History, and
Self-government” [hereinafter “Borrows, ‘Wampum’”] in Asch, supra, note 10, 155, at 157:
A First Nations perspective reflecting the view that they were not conquered was made
by Minavavana, an Ojibwa chief from west of Manitoulin at Michilimackinac.
Minavavana declared:
Englishman, although you have conquered the French you have not yet
conquered us! We are not your slaves. These lakes, these woods and mountains,
were left to us by our ancestors. They are our inheritance; and we will part with
them to none.
16
B. Slattery, “Aboriginal Rights and the Honour of the Crown” (2005) 29 S.C.L.R. (2d) 433,
at 434 and 437 [hereinafter “Slattery, ‘Honour of the Crown’”] wherein Slattery sets out the Court’s
careful wording in Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] S.C.J. No. 70,
[2004] 3 S.C.R. 511, 2004 SCC 73 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Haida Nation”] and Taku River Tlingit
First Nation v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director), [2004] S.C.J. No. 69, [2004] 3
S.C.R. 550 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Taku River”] to “avoid suggesting that the Crown gained
sovereignty over Aboriginal peoples in a lawful or legitimate manner”. However, though the Court is
cautious in its language, the decisions were careful to set out that Aboriginal people do not have a
veto power to object to Crown action, which is not a relationship of equals but one that perpetuates
Crown sovereign authority.
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Interestingly, the way toward reconciliation does not lie solely within
section 35 or within Aboriginal laws because “the law of aboriginal
rights is neither entirely English nor aboriginal in origin: it is a form of
intersocietal law that evolved from long-standing practices linking the
various communities together”.17 An intersocietal approach to
reconciliation then,18 is about creating an inclusive foundation for the
“harmonious relationship” Walters refers to. The framework is something
that is neither wholly of one or the other but which both parties are
reflected in. This paper presents one Aboriginal model of reconciliation
alongside section 35 jurisprudence as a means of “linking the various
communities together” in a more inclusive approach toward reconciliation.
Consider One Dish.19

II. ONE DISH
One Dish20 is an agreement between the Anishinabe and
Haudenosaunee Confederacy21 who together, have something to teach
about sharing. A boundary of fertile land between the two Nations, in
Slattery, “Generative Structure”, supra, note 13, at 595-97.
For a further discussion on “intersocietal law” and the relationship between the Crown
and Aboriginal people, see Slattery, id.; M.D. Walters, “The ‘Golden Thread’ of Continuity:
Aboriginal Customs at Common Law and Under the Constitution Act, 1982” (1999) 44 McGill L.J.
711; J. Borrows & L.I. Rotman, “The Sui Generis Nature of Aboriginal Rights: Does It Make a
Difference?” (1997) 36 Alta. L. Rev. 9 [hereinafter “Borrows & Rotman”]; B. Slattery, “The Legal
Basis of Aboriginal Title” in F. Cassidy, ed., Aboriginal Title in British Columbia: Delgamuukw v.
The Queen (Lantzville, BC: Oolichan Books, 1992), at 120-21.
19
L. Simpson, “Precolonial Nishnaabeg Diplomatic & Treaty Relationships” (2008) 23
Wicazo SA Rev. 29, at 31-32.
20
One Dish is one approach to reconciliation. This model was developed between the
Haudenosaunee and the Anishinabe. Thus, it forms part of the legal traditions of those groups but not
of all Indigenous nations, nor should it be taken as such. The Crown has the responsibility of dealing
with all Indigenous groups and cannot simply take a singular pan-Aboriginal approach, which while
easier and more convenient for the Crown is neither possible nor appropriate given the wide range of
rich cultures, languages, laws and traditions of Indigenous peoples. This is part of the awesome
responsibility the Crown took on by occupying the land and issuing the Royal Proclamation, 1763.
Though reconciliation will be incredibly complicated, that is not a reason to continue to ignore it.
That stated, I have been fortunate enough to have been given some teachings related to One Dish, so
I speak to what I have been taught. I do not speak to all examples of Aboriginal approaches to
reconciliation, though they continue to exist all around us. One Dish then, is illustrative of a
structural approach different from the current colonial, hierarchical model and emphasizes a
relationship between parties more than the particular rules.
21
S.M. Hill, “Traveling Down the River of Life Together in Peace and Friendship, Forever:
Haudenosaunee Land Ethics and Treaty Agreements as the Basis for Restructuring the Relationship
with the British Crown” in L. Simpson, ed., Lighting the Eighth Fire: The Liberation, Resurgence
and Protection of Indigenous Nations (Winnipeg, MB: Arbeiter Ring, 2008).
17
18
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what is now southwestern Ontario, was shared by both Nations long
before European contact.22 The Anishinabe and Haudenosaunee
Confederacy are not possessed of a common language, culture or laws.
However, after over 50 years of a widespread and brutal war, they
reconciled their differences for the benefit of both parties and restored
peace to a region that suffered from disharmony in disagreements over
lands and resources.23 Similarly, lands and resources form the basis of
many disputes between Aboriginal people and Canada. How did the
parties to One Dish find resolution? Laws were established defining the
ways by which resources would be shared and the land was managed
together. Known to the Anishinabe as “One Dish”,24 a wampum belt25
was created as a means to transmit these laws to the people living on the
land. It was understood that the relationship would continue in perpetuity
— and it is still recognized today.26 The Dish in the wampum belt
symbolized the understanding that both Nations would share the bounty
of the land without interference in the other’s sovereignty. Further, for
the Haudenosaunee, the spoon in the bowl in contrast to a knife,
represented peace.27 Adherence to the One Dish agreement required
ongoing diplomatic relations through the exchange of gifts and ceremony
as a means of regular renewal and to ensure peaceful co-existence.28 One
Dish is demonstrative of respect and offers the basis of a workable model
22
Victor P. Lytwyn, “A Dish with One Spoon: The Shared Hunting Grounds Agreement in
the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Valley Region” in David H. Pentland, ed., Papers of the 28th
Algonquian Conference (Winnipeg, MB: University of Manitoba, 1997) 210 [hereinafter “Lytwyn”].
23
For more on the severe nature of the conflict between these two nations that led to the
One Dish agreement, see P.S. Schmalz, The Ojibwa of Southern Ontario (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1991).
24
Alan Corbiere, Project Coordinator of Kinoomaadoog at M’Chigeeng First Nation, as
presented in Rama First Nation, October 2013 [hereinafter “Corbiere”]. In his presentation, Alan
notes this treaty is called “Gdoo-naaganinaa” by the Anishinabe, meaning “Our Dish”. To the
Haudenosaunee this treaty is known as the “Dish with One Spoon”. Alan Corbiere used a replica in
his presentation and advised that the original wampum belt for the treaty is housed in the Royal
Ontario Museum in Toronto.
25
Like a document or written record, wampum belts are read and used for the transmission
of knowledge. For more on wampum belts, see K.V. Muller, “The Two ‘Mystery’ Belts of Grand
River: A Biography of the Two Row Wampum and the Friendship Belt” (2007) 31:1 The American
Indian Quarterly 129; M.J. Becker & J. Lainey, “Wampum Belts With Initials and/or Dates as
Design Elements: A Preliminary Review of One Subcategory of Political Belts” (2004) 28:2
American Indian Culture and Research Journal 25.
26
J. Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
2010), at 133 [hereinafter “Borrows, Indigenous Constitution”].
27
Corbiere, supra, note 24. I offer here only a summary of Alan Corbiere’s reading of the
One Dish wampum. Given the sacred nature of the story, it is not being shared in its entirety.
28
Id.
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for sharing territory and resources while maintaining an agreement of
non-interference in the sovereignty of others. It was a singular law that
was not purely Anishinabe or Haudenosaunee, yet it belonged to and was
maintained by both.29
The formation of One Dish required careful attention to creating the
best conditions for reconciliation. The negotiations between two very
different peoples required what most successful negotiations require:
mutual respect, sharing and responsibility.30 This stands in stark contrast
to the unilateral and hierarchical Crown assertion of sovereignty that is
too often taken for granted and which continues to form the basis for
most Crown/Aboriginal negotiations. One Dish illustrates what these
two Nations31 thought a nation-to-nation relationship should be32 even as
discussions ensued with the Crown leading to the Royal Proclamation,
1763.33 The relationships created between the Crown and Aboriginal
people in this period diverged completely from the One Dish model,
ushering in an ongoing era of imbalance, tension and conflict still
seeking reconciliation.

III. DIVERGENCE
1. But That Was Then ...
In order to move forward and close the distance between Canada and
Aboriginal people, consider how we arrived here. As the French and the
English fought for control over lands in North America, both European
powers sought, and were given, alliances with Aboriginal people. Later,

29
For an in-depth chronicle of Aboriginal power and identity, see M. Witgen, An Infinity of
Nations: How the Native New World Shaped Early North America (Philadelphia, PA: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2011), Ch. 2.
30
Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples in Looking Forward, Looking
Back, Vol. 1 (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1996), “The Basic Principles”, Ch. 16
[hereinafter “Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples”]; also see J. Tully, Public Philosophy in a
New Key: Volume I, Democracy and Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), Ch. 7,
“The Negotiation of Reconciliation” , at 223.
31
One Dish was agreed to between the Haudenosaunee and Anishinabek in Sault Ste. Marie
in 1701: Lytwyn, supra, note 22. To that end, it would have been maintained and within the cultural
and legal construction of both Nations when considering the means by which to create a new
relationship with the Crown.
32
Borrows, Indigenous Constitution, supra, note 26, at 170.
33
Reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 1 [hereinafter “Proclamation”].
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the Treaty of Paris formalized the English victory over the French,34
though not over Aboriginal people, and gave the English control over
some of the lands now forming Canada without considering the preexisting relationship of Aboriginal people to these same lands.35
Moreover, the post-war era quickly gave way to a growing settler
population, predictably leading to land-based conflicts with Aboriginal
people. This created a complication for the Crown. Aboriginal peoples’
military prowess in response to settler encroachment threatened the
Crown’s expansion further into North America.36 The Crown
subsequently concluded that Aboriginal rights must be formally
acknowledged.37 The result was a royal decree, which sprouted the
colonial seed from which the relationship between Canada and
Aboriginal people struggles to grow.38 The Crown’s colonial-based
superiority was imbedded in Canada centuries ago39 with the words of
the Royal Proclamation, 1763:40
And whereas it is just and reasonable, and essential to our Interest, and
the Security of our Colonies, that the several Nations or Tribes of
Indians with whom We are connected, and who live under our
Protection, should not be molested or disturbed in the Possession of
such Parts of Our Dominions and Territories as, not having been ceded
to or purchased by Us, are reserved to them, or any of them, as their
Hunting Grounds. ...
And whereas great Frauds and Abuses have been committed in
purchasing Lands of the Indians, to the great Prejudice of our Interests
and to the great Dissatisfaction of the said Indians; In order, therefore,
to prevent such Irregularities for the future, and to the end that the
Indians may be convinced of our Justice and determined Resolution to
remove all reasonable Cause of Discontent. …41

In order to “remove all reasonable Cause of Discontent” of the
“Nations or Tribes of Indians”, the Crown proclaims that it alone is in
charge of the relationship with Aboriginal people, a position which
34

M. Asch, On Being Here To Stay: Treaties and Aboriginal Rights in Canada (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2014), at 153 [hereinafter “Asch, Here to Stay”].
35
Borrows, “Wampum”, supra, note 15, at 157.
36
Borrows, Indigenous Constitution, supra, note 26, at 133.
37
Id.
38
J. Borrows, “With or Without You: First Nations Laws (in Canada)” (1996) 41 McGill L.J. 629.
39
B. Slattery, “Understanding Aboriginal Rights” (1987) 66 Can. Bar Rev. 727.
40
Proclamation, supra, note 33.
41
Id.
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continues to be reflected in subsequent jurisprudence and a barrier to
achieving reconciliation. At its best the language of the Royal
Proclamation illustrates a relationship of close proximity with Aboriginal
people and acknowledges Aboriginal title by stating that land must either
have been purchased from Aboriginal people through sale to the Crown
or for such lands not purchased, remain available for Aboriginal people.42
Conversely, it also categorizes Aboriginal people as dependent43 and
living under Crown protection from the Crown’s own citizenry44 — all
neatly accomplished with a few choice words.
Still, opportunity for the Crown to maintain honest relations
presented itself a year later in 1764, when 24 Aboriginal Nations
gathered with the Crown at Niagara.45 Runners were sent to all the
Aboriginal people living in the region.46 No Nation in the area was left
out because the gathering was foundationally important to everyone
living on the land. Here, “a nation-to-nation relationship between settler
and First Nation peoples was renewed and extended ... The Royal
Proclamation became a treaty at Niagara because it was presented by
colonialists for affirmation, and was accepted by First Nations.”47
The Aboriginal perspective on nation-to-nation relationships,
including the implication of respect, meant that each party came to the
agreement with its own customs, traditions and laws, as would be
expected of and respected by any other nation. Note too, that like the
Royal Proclamation, the Treaty of Niagara acknowledged the renewal
and extension of alliances48 already in existence prior to this treatymaking event.49 The parties were known to each other. There was an
expectation of ongoing maintenance. In these ways, the Treaty of
Niagara was reflective of the inclusive spirit of the relationship
42
J. Borrows “Constitutional Law from a First Nation Perspective: Self-Government and
the Royal Proclamation” (1994) 28 U.B.C.L. Rev. 1-47.
43
Id.
44
Borrows, “Wampum”, supra, note 15.
45
For a more in-depth relating of events surrounding the Treaty of Paris and its subsequent
implementation in Canada, as well as an accounting of the Treaty of Niagara, see C.G. Calloway, The
Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation of North America (Oxford University Press, 2006).
46
Borrows, “Wampum”, supra, note 15, at 162.
47
Id., at 161.
48
Id.
49
Over the years, treaty-making has continued as a Crown practice in Canada since 1764
with varying degrees of activity and has resulted in hundreds of agreements, many of which, as
Borrows notes in Indigenous Constitution, supra, note 26, at 133, “draw on some form of Indigenous
legal tradition”, demonstrating in the historical record a practice of taking an intersocietal approach
in the relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal people.
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Aboriginal people believed was described in the Royal Proclamation.50
The Crown did not see the Royal Proclamation in the same way. But
context and perspective matters.
With respect to the Proclamation, “using the written words of the
document alone [t]o interpret the principles of the Proclamation ... would
conceal First Nations perspectives and inappropriately privilege one
culture’s practice over another”.51 This is precisely what has happened.
The Royal Proclamation became the Crown’s justification for its
assertion of sovereignty over Aboriginal people and the Crown’s taking
of lands in order to make room for the settler population. Thus,
settlement and Confederation transpired by ignoring the Aboriginal
understanding of the relationship and subverting both the rights and title
of Aboriginal people. This sleight of hand is reinforced in jurisprudence
insofar as “Aboriginal title is a burden on the Crown’s underlying title”.52
Therein, history holds the invention of Crown sovereignty, which both
ran roughshod over the perspective of Aboriginal people and has been
supported by the Courts. Moreover, the subsequent failure of the law to
place the Proclamation in context has germinated centuries of broken
promises and mistrust. Unsurprisingly, reconciling the vast distance
between Canada and Aboriginal people is complicated.53
2. And This Is Now ...
Land disputes between Aboriginal people and the settler population
continue still. Contemporary law regarding Aboriginal title continues to
refer to the Proclamation. For instance, in Calder v. British Columbia
(Attorney General)54 — a title case about lands historically occupied by
the Nisga’a people in British Columbia — elements of the Proclamation
are echoed in law over two centuries later. In response to years of Crown
denial of the existence of Aboriginal title,55 the Supreme Court
Borrows, “Wampum”, supra, note 15, at 162.
Borrows, Indigenous Constitution, supra, note 26.
Delgamuukw, supra, note 12.
53
Borrows, Indigenous Constitution, supra, note 26, Ch. 1.
54
[1973] S.C.J. No. 56, [1973] S.C.R. 313 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Calder”].
55
Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, [2014] S.C.J. No. 44, 2014 SCC 44 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Tsilhqot’in”] has recently been decided by the Supreme Court of Canada. This case
involved questions of Aboriginal title and challenged the Crown’s position that if the Tsilhqot’in
people hold Aboriginal title then is it limited to small plots of land that the people have inhabited
consistently (this is known as the “postage-stamp” theory of Aboriginal title and is a continued
attempt to limit Aboriginal title). The Tsilhqot’in on the other hand, claimed title over a much larger
50
51
52
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determined that there is such a thing after all.56 In response to Calder, the
Crown revived its treaty-making practice through a comprehensive landclaims policy as a means to achieve settlement with respect to Aboriginal
title.57 This shift in law and subsequent Crown policy58 illustrates the
same duality in the Crown’s agenda as we saw in the simultaneous desire
to both protect and dominate Aboriginal people via the wording of the
Royal Proclamation. On one hand, the policy puts negotiation, not
protracted litigation, at the forefront of the Crown/Aboriginal
relationship and led to the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement.59
To this extent, a negotiated resolution is preferred because it at least
allows for the possibility that both parties will learn something from each
other and share a commonly owned resolution. On the other, Crown
policy requires an exchange of Aboriginal peoples’ surrender of any
claims to Aboriginal title (both current and future), for the settler
population’s certainty about their own land rights. This modern-day
practice is hardly demonstrative of the Aboriginal understanding of the
“nation-to-nation” relationship entered into at Niagara in 1764 as equals.
The Crown’s colonialist scheme can also be felt in R. v. Sparrow60 — a
challenge to a Fisheries Act prosecution based on an Aboriginal right to fish
— which offered the Court its first opportunity to interpret section 35(1).
The Court declared that Aboriginal rights not extinguished prior to 1982
were protected from subsequent Crown extinguishment, which was merely

area, namely, their traditional territory, and were successful on their arguments both at trial and in
the Supreme Court of Canada. Though Tsilhqot’in was not decided at the time this paper was
originally written, the Court’s decision is consistent with the author’s premise that reconciliation
requires more than mere capitulation on the part of Aboriginal peoples in favour of the settler
population. The recalibration set out in Tsilhqot’in holds the potential to be both a considerable and
positive shift toward reconciliation by creating opportunity for federal and provincial Crowns,
private enterprise and Aboriginal people to come together in agreement on land and resource
development in more cooperative ways or risk future protracted litigation.
56
Newman, supra, note 3.
57
K. McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989).
58
K. McNeil, “Aboriginal Title and the Supreme Court: What’s Happening” (2006) 69
Sask. L. Rev. 282.
59
The James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (“JBQNA”) was the first treaty in
Canada since the 1920s, when the Crown stopped its practice of treaty-making. For a considered
example relating to the effectiveness of co-management and joint decision-making elements between
the Crown and the James Bay Cree based on the terms of the JBQNA, see J. Webber & C.H. Scott,
“Conflicts Between Cree Hunting and Sporting Hunting: Co-Management Decision Making at
James Bay” in C. Scott, ed., Aboriginal Autonomy and Development in Northern Quebec and
Labrador (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011); and E.J. Peters, “Native People and the Environmental
Regime in the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement” (1999) 52:4 Arctic 395.
60
[1990] S.C.J. No. 49, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Sparrow”].
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an affirmation of the wording already contained within section 35.61 Further,
the Court took a restrictive approach and ruled that the exercise of those
rights could be subject to regulatory infringement in certain circumstances.62
This is inconsistent with both the 1764 Aboriginal perspective at Niagara,
which envisaged as a relationship of equals, and the wording of the Royal
Proclamation that acknowledged Aboriginal title long before 1982. The
Proclamation has never been overturned. The Treaty of Niagara has never
been revoked. Yet, the Court in Sparrow propped up the long-refuted
position by Aboriginal people that the Crown acquired sovereignty by
legitimate or lawful means.63 Canadian Courts have affirmed this principle
explicitly and implicitly, over and over again,64 as though the more it is
repeated the more true it becomes.65 Adopting a narrow view in Sparrow, the
Court missed an opportunity66 to investigate the meaning of the Royal
Proclamation and offer a more fully contextualized account of its meaning,
which recognizes both the Crown and Aboriginal peoples’ perspectives.
Sparrow cleared the way for another decision promoting colonial
hierarchy, R. v. Van der Peet.67 Here, by characterizing Aboriginal rights
as historical,68 the Court charted a course towards constraining
Aboriginal rights69 by recognizing only those rights that were “integral to
61
K. McNeil, “The Constitutional Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada” (1982) 4
S.C.L.R. 255, at 257 [hereinafter “McNeil, ‘Constitutional Rights’”].
62
K. McNeil, “How Can Infringements of the Constitutional Rights of Aboriginal Peoples
Be Justified?” (1996) 8:2 Const. Forum Const. 33.
63
J. Borrows, “Domesticating Doctrines: Aboriginal Peoples after the Royal Commission”
(2001) 46 McGill L.J. 615.
64
As set out in note 55, supra, the most recent articulation of this by the Crown is found in the
postage-stamp theory of Aboriginal title argued in Tsilhqot’in, which was rejected in the trial decision
and again by the Supreme Court of Canada. The Supreme Court ultimately found that the Tsilhqot’in
proved Aboriginal title to their traditional lands. This movement by the Supreme Court further away
from a wholesale acceptance of Crown sovereignty (as Slattery points out in “Honour of the Crown”,
supra, note 16, in Haida Nation, supra, note 16, the Court shifts its language of “acquisition” of Crown
sovereignty toward “assertion”), may be indicative of the Court’s efforts to calibrate the relationship in
contemplation of reconciliation. Tsilhqot’in and Haida Nation, however, against repeated interpretations
of Crown sovereignty relating to the Royal Proclamation and again in Calder, supra, note 54; Sparrow,
supra, note 60; Van der Peet, supra, note 12, Gladstone, infra, note 71, and others, does not necessarily
mean that the shift needed to achieve reconciliation is complete.
65
J. Borrows, “Sovereignty’s Alchemy: An Analysis of Delgamuukw v. British Columbia”
(1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 537.
66
M. Asch & P. Macklem, “Aboriginal Rights and Canadian Sovereignty: An Essay on
R. v. Sparrow” (1991) 9 Alta. L. Rev. 498.
67
Van der Peet, supra, note 12. This case was about an Aboriginal commercial right to sell fish.
68
Slattery, “Honour of the Crown”, supra, note 16, at 595.
69
R.L. Barsh & J. (Sa’ke’j) Youngblood Henderson, “The Supreme Court’s Van der Peet
Trilogy: Naïve Imperialism and Ropes of Sand” (1997) 42 McGill L.J. 993 [hereinafter “Barsh &
Youngblood Henderson”].
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the distinctive cultures” of Aboriginal people — meaning the Aboriginal
right must be central to the culture, have existed pre-contact and be
continuous in order to be legitimated in Canadian law.70 Put a different
way, no matter how long or consistently an Aboriginal group has been
hunting and fishing, these activities may not necessarily be deemed an
Aboriginal constitutional right since all societies have a need to feed
themselves, not just Aboriginal ones.
R. v. Gladstone71 — released alongside Van der Peet — further
constricts Aboriginal rights.72 In this case, “reconciliation became a
vehicle for infringement in the name of non-aboriginal appeasement”.73
Thus, in Van der Peet and Gladstone we see that section 35(1) is a
constitutional effort to hierarchically organize Aboriginal rights
underneath Crown sovereignty rather than engage with the ways that
Aboriginal rights could be reconciled with the existence and needs of the
settlers.74 If there was any doubt, the Court made the point clear by
stating that section 35(1) “provides the constitutional framework for
reconciliation of the pre-existence of distinctive aboriginal societies
occupying the land with Crown sovereignty”.75 Given the Crown’s longstanding position on sovereignty, the tests in Van der Peet and Gladstone
should not have come as a surprise, nor should the Court’s view of
section 35(1) as part of the colonial apparatus to disrupt Aboriginal rights
and title. Such an approach renders the Constitution a tool of subversion
of Aboriginal rights.76 Taken together, the decisions assist in solidifying
the Crown’s sense of its legitimacy and do not lend themselves to hope
of reconciliation so long as this fundamental flaw persists.

Slattery, “Honour of the Crown”, supra, note 16.
[1996] S.C.J. No. 79, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Gladstone”], regarding a
modification of the test in Sparrow, which gives increased deference to the Crown in protecting the
Crown’s commercial fishing rights.
72
Barsh & Youngblood Henderson, supra, note 69.
73
D. Johnston, Preface, in C. Bell & R.K. Patterson, eds., Protection of First Nation
Cultural Heritage: Laws, Policy and Reform (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009).
74
Borrows, Indigenous Constitution, supra, note 26, Ch. 5.
75
Van der Peet, supra, note 12, at para. 42.
76
Id., at para. 31:
More specifically, what s. 35(1) does is provide the constitutional framework through
which the fact that aboriginals lived on the land in distinctive societies, with their own
practices, traditions and cultures, is acknowledged and reconciled with the sovereignty of
the Crown. The substantive rights which fall within the provision must be defined in light
of this purpose; the aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1) must be directed
towards the reconciliation of the pre-existence of aboriginal societies with the sovereignty
of the Crown.
70
71
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If Sparrow sweeps aside recognition of Aboriginal rights and title in the
Royal Proclamation yet supports the acquisition of Crown sovereignty,77 and
Van der Peet limits Aboriginal rights in favour of non-Aboriginal interests,78
why should Aboriginal people seek to reconcile? The relationship is so
fraught with fundamental power imbalances.79 Why should Aboriginal
people expend resources pursuing agreements with the Crown when the
outcomes are so heavily stacked in the Crown’s favour?80 This set-up is not
reflective of Walters’ “reconciliation as relationship” paradigm. With the
Crown’s power advantage, why should reconciliation matter to anyone? Part
of the answer may be found in Delgamuukw.81
In this decision, then Chief Justice Lamer described in wider terms
the same relationship his Court had restrained a year earlier in Van der
Peet and Gladstone when he concluded:
... Ultimately, it is through negotiated settlements, with good faith and
give and take on all sides, reinforced by the judgments of this Court,
that we will achieve what I stated in Van der Peet, supra, at para. 31, to
be a basic purpose of section 35(1) – “the reconciliation of the preexistence of aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the Crown.”
Let us face it, we are all here to stay.82

And therein lies the rub. No one is going anywhere. Aboriginal
people and the settler population are all here to stay.83 Is it not preferable
to smooth things out so our time together is less discordant? This is
something greater than a quaint notion because “the culture of law is
weakened in the country as a whole if Indigenous peoples’ legal

77

Asch, Here to Stay, supra, note 34.
J. Rudin, “One Step Forward, Two Steps Back – The Political and Institutional Dynamics
Behind the Supreme Court of Canada’s Decisions in R. v. Sparrow, R. v. Van der Peet and
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia” (1998) 13 J. L. & Soc. Pol’y 67.
79
For discussion on balancing Aboriginal people’s right to govern as a third order of
government in Canada, see the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, supra, note 30, Vol. 2
at 163-244.
80
S. Lawrence & P. Macklem, “From Consultation to Reconciliation: Aboriginal Rights
and the Crown’s Duty to Consult” (2000) 79 Can. Bar Rev. 252; S. Imai, “Sound Science, Careful
Policy Analysis and Ongoing Relationships: Integrating Litigation and Negotiation in Aboriginal
Lands and Resources Disputes” (2003) 31 Osgoode Hall L.J. 587; Slattery, “Generative Structure”,
supra, note 13.
81
Delgamuukw, supra, note 12. Though the Court did not make a decision on Aboriginal
title, this case does, however, set out the test for title — which was found to be a “burden on the
Crown”. The Court also found the important value of oral history of Aboriginal peoples as being on
par with written history.
82
Id., at para. 186 (emphasis added).
83
Asch, Here to Stay, supra, note 34, at 152-55.
78
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traditions are excluded from its matrix … [n]ot only do we lose the
wisdom they could provide about how to organize relationships … but
we also fail to attend to the underlying injustice of Canada’s creation and
development.”84 Thus, quality relationships matter to the well-being of
the country. Yet, how can there be a reasonable expectation of
reconciliation “through negotiated settlements with good faith”, if good
faith comes in limited doses85 and both parties often see themselves as
oppositional?86 How does that conversation even start?87 It begins with
letting go of imperialism and snipping the root of colonial supremacy. It
begins by creating something uniquely Canadian, something
intersocietal.88 It is seen with the Court’s own shift away from its
reasoning in Van der Peet to Delgamuukw and when it subsequently and
more expressly rearticulated the purpose of section 35 as a broader
“reconciliation of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians in a
mutually respectful long-term relationship”.89

IV. A MADE IN “CANADA” APPROACH
One Dish, in my view, required four elements for success, which
when taken together offer an Aboriginal contribution90 to what is either
84

Borrows, Indigenous Constitution, supra, note 26, at 122.
For a justification of the Crown’s limited investment in negotiations, see T. Flanagan,
First Nations? Second Thoughts (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press 2000); for more on
Crown self-imposed limited interest in resolution of specific claims with Aboriginal people (i.e.,
lands admittedly wrongfully taken by the Crown for which compensation will be negotiated only
with the Crown under terms established by the Crown in its own policy), see <http://www.aadncaandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100030501/1100100030506>.
86
For critiques of oppositional positioning between the Crown and Aboriginal people, see
M. Sinclair, “Aboriginal People and Euro-Canadians: Two World Views” in J.H. Hylton, ed.,
Aboriginal Self-Government in Canada: Current Trends and Issues (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing,
1994) 19; M.E. Turpel, “Home/Land” (1991-1992) 10 Can. J. Fam. L. 17.
87
Slattery, “Generative Structure”, supra, note 13, suggests “the essence of aboriginal
rights lies in their bridging of aboriginal and non-aboriginal cultures, so that the law of aboriginal
rights is neither entirely English nor aboriginal in origin”. This is significant in that perhaps a
conversation starts between two seemingly disparate parties by finding resolution that is something
new; somewhat familiar and meaningful to both, yet formed neither wholly of one nor of the other.
88
J. Webber, “Relations of Force and Relations of Justice: The Emergence of Normative
Community between Colonists and Aboriginal Peoples” (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall L.J. 623
[hereinafter “Webber”].
89
Beckman v. Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, [2010] S.C.J. No. 53, 2010 SCC 53,
[2010] 3 S.C.R. 103, at para. 10 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Little Salmon/Carmacks”].
90
There are many Aboriginal contributions to reconciliation, which vary by region and
Nation. One Dish is one example, although it is not the only one even among the Anishinabe or
Haudenosaunee. It is the one that these two Nations created together in 1701.
85
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already present in or arising from section 35 jurisprudence, thereby
creating a basis for giving meaning to intersocietal law as a vehicle for
reconciliation.
1. Honour
Enter the doctrine of honour.91 In order for there to be a working
relationship and adherence to any agreement — as demonstrated by the
vast boundary and resource sharing between the Anishinabe and the
Haudenosaunee — following the terms of the agreement itself requires
good conduct and at its deepest base, honour. Applying the Van der Peet
test in a broader sense, it may be said that “honour” is an integral part of
all human societies, not a particular or distinct custom of either
Aboriginal people or the Crown, and thereby an intersocietal value.
Further, as set out as recently as Manitoba Metis Federation Inc. v.
Canada (Attorney General),92 the doctrine of honour of the Crown is
both substantive and inclusive for the Crown’s dealings with Aboriginal
peoples.93 The Court’s recognition of the importance and weight of this
doctrine is helpful when considering a One Dish approach. Yet the
continued unilateral assumption of sovereignty in the Court’s
jurisprudence, whether acquired or asserted,94 and the ongoing Courtsanctioned subversion of Aboriginal rights and title in favour of those of
the settler population imports a one-sided superiority that One Dish
rejects. In order to move toward Walters’ conceptualization of
reconciliation, the current inequality between the rights and title of
Aboriginal people and the rights of the settler population must be
levelled off.
In Delgamuukw,95 the Court further entrenched colonial order by stating
that Aboriginal title is a burden on the Crown’s underlying title.96 Continued
acceptance of Crown sovereignty subordinates Aboriginal title97 and

Slattery, “Generative Structure”, supra, note 13; Newman, supra, note 3.
[2013] S.C.J. No. 14, 2013 SCC 14, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 623 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Manitoba
Metis”]; for another recent case on the doctrine of honour, see also Mohawks of the Bay of Quinte v.
Canada, [2013] F.C.J. No. 741, 2013 FC 669 (F.C.).
93
Manitoba Metis, id., at paras. 70 and 94.
94
Slattery, “Generative Structure”, supra, note 13.
95
Delgamuukw, supra, note 12.
96
Id., at 1098, per Lamer C.J.C.
97
B. Slattery, “The Metamorphosis of Aboriginal Title” (2006) 85 Can. Bar Rev. 255;
Webber, supra, note 88; Borrows & Rotman, supra, note 18.
91
92
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understandably riles Aboriginal people.98 Such a fundamental imbalance99
does not beget a fair and principled relationship that is sustainable.100 In an
effort to smooth out the rough edges, the Court offers up the doctrine of
honour as a starting point.101 While the Court establishes honour as a feature
of how the Crown must conduct itself in all of its dealings with Aboriginal
people,102 the doctrine only proves meaningful toward reconciliation if it
brings about something more than using good manners to extinguish
Aboriginal rights with a legislated “please” and “thank you”.103 Unless, of
course, reconciliation means the wholesale capitulation by Aboriginal people
in favour of the Crown and the settler population. One Dish required both
Nations to approach each other not only with honour but as equals. That
stated, the doctrine of honour offers some movement forward,104 and carries
the potential to bring about change.
In Haida Nation105 and Taku River106 the Court expanded the doctrine
by moving it beyond merely a guidepost of conduct into substantive
obligations through the duty to consult:107

98
P. Macklem, “First Nations Self-Government and the Borders of the Canadian Legal
Imagination” (1991) 36 McGill L.J. 382 [hereinafter “Macklem, ‘First Nations Self-Government’”];
Slattery, “Generative Structure”, supra, note 13.
99
P. Macklem, “What’s Law Got to Do With It? The Protection of Aboriginal Title in
Canada” (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 125.
100
For more on the unsustainability of the relationship between Canada and Aboriginal
people, see McNeil, “Constitutional Rights”, supra, note 61; W. Pentney, ”The Rights of the
Aboriginal Peoples of Canada in the Constitution Act, 1982 Part II — Section 35: The Substantive
Guarantee” (1988) 22 U.B.C. L. Rev. 207; and B. Slattery, “The Constitutional Guarantee of
Aboriginal and Treaty Rights” (1982) 8 Queen’s L.J. 232.
101
Haida Nation, supra, note 16, at para. 17, quoting Van der Peet, supra, note 12, at para. 31:
The historical roots of the principle of the honour of the Crown suggest that it must be
understood generously in order to reflect underlying realities from which it stems. In all
its dealing with Aboriginal peoples, from the assertion of sovereignty to the resolution of
claims and the implementation of treaties, the Crown must act honourably. Nothing less
is required if we are to achieve “the reconciliation of the pre-existence of aboriginal
societies with the sovereignty of the Crown”.
102
Haida Nation, supra, note 16.
103
B. Slattery, Ancestral Lands, Alien Laws: Judicial Perspectives on Aboriginal Title
(Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1983); and Asch, supra, note 34.
104
B. Slattery, “A Taxonomy of Aboriginal Rights” in H. Foster, H. Raven & J. Webber,
eds., Let Right Be Done: Calder, Aboriginal Title and the Future of Indigenous Rights (Vancouver:
University of British Columbia Press, 2011) Ch. 7 [hereinafter “Let Right Be Done”]; and Slattery,
“Generative Structure”, supra, note 13.
105
Haida Nation, supra, note 16.
106
Taku River, supra, note 16.
107
Slattery, “Generative Structure”, supra, note 13.
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Put simply, Canada’s Aboriginal peoples were here when Europeans
came, and were never conquered. Many bands reconciled their claims
with the sovereignty of the Crown through negotiated treaties. Others,
notably in British Columbia, have yet to do so. The potential rights
embedded in these claims are protected by s. 35 of the Constitution Act,
1982. The honour of the Crown requires that these rights be determined,
recognized and respected. This, in turn, requires the Crown, acting
honourably, to participate in processes of negotiation. While this process
continues, the honour of the Crown may require it to consult and, where
indicated, accommodate Aboriginal interests.108

However, in Haida Nation, the Court offered no analysis of how it
arrived at its bold “never any doubt”109 acceptance of Crown sovereignty
in Sparrow but rather quietly shifted its language, thereby again leaving
reconciliation prospects slim.110 More explicitly, reconciliation premised
on such colonial assumptions is not achievable.111 On a more positive side,
in Taku River, the Court established that the doctrine of honour is neither a
historical relic nor about good manners. It is the foundation of the
relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal people in terms of both the
treaties of the past and the agreements of the future.112 In addition to
establishing section 35(1) as constitutional protection for Aboriginal rights
and title, the Court also spent some time setting out a basis for negotiated
resolution. In so doing, the Court furthered its thinking in Delgamuukw.
With these cases there is acceptance that honour is necessary for not only
building but maintaining relationships, and is fundamentally valuable for
both the Crown and Aboriginal people.113
108

Haida Nation, supra, note 16, at para. 25 (emphasis added).
In Sparrow, supra, note 60, the Court neatly sums up 15 years of s. 35(1) jurisprudence
of accepting the acquisition of Crown sovereignty at para. 49:
It is worth recalling that while British policy towards the native population was based on
respect for their right to occupy their traditional lands, a proposition to which the Royal
Proclamation of 1763 bears witness, there was from the outset never any doubt that
sovereignty and legislative power, and indeed the underlying title, to such lands vested
with the Crown ...
The Court had opportunity to more actively step away from the acceptance of Crown sovereignty.
110
For more on the impact of the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty on Aboriginal people,
see, Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, supra, note 30.
111
P. Macklem, “Distributing Sovereignty: Indian Nations and Equality of Peoples” (1993)
45 Stan. L. Rev. 1311.
112
Taku River, supra, note 16, at para. 24: “In all its dealings with Aboriginal peoples, the
Crown must act honourably, in accordance with its historical and future relationship with the
Aboriginal peoples in question.”
113
S. Imai, “Creating Disincentives to Negotiate: Mitchell v. M.N.R’s Potential effect on
Dispute Resolution” (2003) 22 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 309.
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In both Haida Nation and Taku River then, the Court is urging
negotiated resolve of differences, which offers both the Crown and
Aboriginal people opportunity so long as the negotiations are not
reflective of past Crown policy on land claims, which would start from
the premise that Aboriginal people must give something else up while the
Crown counts further gains in its favour. If the element of honour is the
starting place for the parties to approach each other, the Crown will also
have to “recognize and respect” Aboriginal context and determine what
the Crown is prepared to contribute to reconciliation. Such an action
would be similar to what the Haudenosaunee and Anishinabe would have
done to bring about One Dish.114
Moreover, to achieve reconciliation the Crown must be prepared to
sit at an inclusive nation-to-nation table that includes the Métis,115 who,
“after having lived in the shadows for generations … slowly began to
come out of hiding”.116 Section 35(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982
defines “aboriginal peoples” as including Métis people,117 yet they have
historically fallen in between118 — not Indian for the purposes of the
Indian Act but not settlers either. There cannot be any denying that their
history and relationship with the Crown is also one fraught with
frustration,119 though so few constitutional cases have considered the
Métis.120 Manitoba Metis121 expands the inclusivity of honour of the
114

Corbiere, supra, note 24.
For a historical background and government structures relating to Metis in Canada, see
D. Purich, The Metis (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1988), and J. Madden, “The Metis Nations’ SelfGovernment Agenda: Issues and Options for the Future” in F. Wilson & M. Mallet, eds., MetisCrown Relations: Rights, Identity, Jurisdiction, and Governance (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2008).
116
J. Teillet, “The Métis and Thirty Years of Section 35: How Constitutional Protection for
Métis Rights Has Led to the Loss of the Rule of Law” in J. Cameron & S. Lawrence, eds. (2012) 58
S.C.L.R. (2d) 333, at 341 [hereinafter “Teillet”].
117
Constitution, supra, note 2; C. Bell, “Who Are the Metis People in Section 35(2)” (1991)
29 Alta. L. Rev. 351. The courts have likewise found that the word “Indian” in s. 91(24) includes the
Metis: see Daniels v. Canada, [2013] F.C.J. No. 4, [2013] 2 F.C.R. 268 (F.C.), vard [2014] F.C.J.
No. 383, 2014 FCA 101 (F.C.A.).
118
See M.L. Stevenson, “Metis Aboriginal Rights and the ‘Core of Indianness’” (2004) 67
Sask. L. Rev. 301; P. Chartrand, “Aboriginal Rights: The Dispossession of the Metis” (1991) 20
Osgoode Hall L.J. 457; L.N. Chartrand, “Are We Metis or Are We Indians? A Commentary on R. v.
Grumbo” (1999-2000) 13 Ottawa L. Rev. 267.
119
For further discussion, see P. Chartrand & J. Goikas, “Defining ‘The Metis People’: The
Hard Case of Canadian Aboriginal Law” in P. Chartrand, ed., Canada’s Aboriginal People
(Saskatoon: Purich Publishing Ltd., 2002); and D. McMahon & F. Martin, “The Metis and 91(24): Is
Inclusion the Issue?” in P. Macklem et al., Aboriginal Self-Government: Legal and Constitutional
Issues (Ottawa: Department of Supply and Services Canada, 1995).
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Teillet, supra, note 116.
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Manitoba Metis, supra, note 92.
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Crown.122 This decision is significant in that with Métis included in the
application of the doctrine of honour, it “gives rise to a duty of diligent,
purposive fulfillment”,123 of Crown conduct, which the Court will not be
hesitant to determine.124
The Crown’s argument was essentially that if there ever was a duty
toward the Métis in Manitoba to provide lands, the claim is statute-barred
or, alternatively, barred by the doctrine of laches.125 The Court rejected
the Crown’s submission on the basis that it was inconsistent with
reconciling the relationship between the Métis people and the Crown. By
holding that the honour of the Crown was owed and continuing but not
present in its dealings with the Métis, the Court demonstrated that it is
prepared to be critical of constitutive moments in the formation of the
country. Ultimately, Manitoba Metis scolds the Crown on its ethics while
still not providing the Métis with a long-promised land base. In this way,
the decision does not fully serve to uphold the “acts of mutual respect,

122

Id., at para. 94. The Court states, at paras. 70 and 94:
The application of these precedents to this case indicates that the honour of the Crown is
also engaged by an explicit obligation to an Aboriginal group that is enshrined in the
Constitution. The Constitution is not a mere statute; it is the very document by which the
‘Crow[n] assert[ed its] sovereignty in the face of prior Aboriginal occupation’: Taku
River, at para. 24. See also Mitchell v. M.N.R., 2001 SCC 33, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911, at
para. 9. It is at the root of the honour of the Crown, and an explicit obligation to an
Aboriginal group placed therein engages the honour of the Crown at its core. As stated in
Haida Nation, ‘[i]n all its dealings with Aboriginal peoples, from the assertion of
sovereignty to the resolution of claims and the implementation of treaties, the Crown
must act honourably’: para. 17 (emphasis added).
...
... In accordance with the principles outlined above, the honour of the Crown is engaged
by s. 31 and gives rise to a duty of diligent, purposive fulfillment.
123
Id., at para. 94.
124
In dealing with the Crown’s position that it did not owe any obligations to the Métis of
Manitoba under the terms of the Manitoba Act, the Court found, id., at para. 133: “We have
concluded that Canada did not act diligently to fulfill the specific obligation to the Métis contained
in s. 31 of the Manitoba Act, as required by the honour of the Crown.”
125
The majority of the Court — to the vehement objection of the dissent — did not accept
this position (Manitoba Metis, id., at paras. 135 and 139):
Thus, this Court has found that limitations of actions statutes cannot prevent the courts, as
guardians of the Constitution, from issuing declarations on the constitutionality of
legislation. By extension, limitations acts cannot prevent the courts from issuing a
declaration on the constitutionality of the Crown’s conduct.
...
However, at this point we are not concerned with an action for breach of fiduciary duty,
but with a claim for a declaration that the Crown did not act honourably in implementing
the constitutional obligation in s. 31 of the Manitoba Act. Limitations acts cannot bar
claims of this nature.
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tolerance and goodwill that serve to heal rifts and create the foundations
for a harmonious relationship”.126
The Court has already stated that the relationship between the Crown
and Aboriginal people is ongoing and not limited to the times and dates
of treaties or agreements.127 Recall too that the Royal Proclamation and
subsequent cases reflect the Crown’s commitment to act honourably so
as to “remove all reasonable Cause of Discontent” of the “Nations or
Tribes of Indians with whom We are connected”.128 In Manitoba Metis,
the Court has ensured that Métis people are part of those Nations or
Tribes to which the Crown’s duty of honour is owed and that such a duty
is fundamental to reconciliation. If Métis can meet the test for Aboriginal
rights and title set out in Powley,129 which modified the tests in Sparrow
and Van der Peet — and indeed the Métis have been doing so through a
slowly growing body of jurisprudence130 — they should also be part of a
reconciliation process.
Manitoba Metis is about old relationships, broken promises and the
substantive role honour plays in “negotiated settlements with good faith
and a give and take on all sides”.131 The doctrine of honour is a legally
enforceable obligation, not merely a notion of best practices when
available in order to avoid sharp dealing by the Crown,132 meaning the
Court has placed an importance on trust in the relationship, which is
repeated in Mitchell133 and Little Salmon/Carmacks.134 As such, there is
no reason to doubt the sincerity of the Chief Justice in prioritizing
reconciliation. With both One Dish and section 35 jurisprudence agreeing
that honour is required in order to establish trust, there is a mutual

126

Walters, supra, note 5.
Manitoba Metis, supra, note 92.
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Proclamation, supra, note 33.
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R. v. Powley, [2003] S.C.J. No. 43, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 207, 2003 SCC 43 (S.C.C.) modified
the tests in Sparrow, supra, note 60 and Van der Peet, supra, note 12, by defining a 10-step test for
Métis rights, including the right to hunt as an Aboriginal right.
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Teillet, supra, note 116; see also C. Bell, “Metis Constitutional Rights in Section 35(1)”
(1997) 36 Alta. L. Rev. 180.
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Delgamuukw, supra, note 12, at para. 186.
132
For more on “sharp dealing”, see R. v. Badger, [1996] S.C.J. No. 39, [1996] 1 S.C.R.
771, at para. 41 (S.C.C.); R. v. Marshall, [1999] S.C.J. No. 55, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456, at para. 4
(S.C.C.); Haida Nation, supra, note 16, at para. 19; Manitoba Métis, supra, note 92, at para. 73.
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Supra, note 12, at para. 129, wherein the Court encourages Aboriginal and nonAboriginal Canadians to work together for common purpose.
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Little Salmon/Carmacks, supra, note 89; and Manitoba Metis, supra, note 93, at paras.
97-98, where the Court encourages a harmonious co-existence of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal
Canadians based on trust.
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opening toward reconciliation and fertile ground to negotiate a new
relationship.
2. Consultation
Effectively reconciling a relationship “carries with it the processes
that are needed to overcome a culture of suspicion, mistrust and fear”.135
Thus, it is also the process136 and the building of principles137 necessary
to bring about resolution that are also vitally important. The parties to
One Dish had neither a common culture nor a common language. Still
they managed to engage in diplomatic discussions with each other in
order to come to terms. It would have taken rounds of consultation with
the parties both internal to each Nation and with each other prior to
coming to agreement.138 Haida Nation declares that “[t]he government’s
duty to consult with Aboriginal peoples and accommodate their interests
is grounded in the honour of the Crown”,139 which is echoed in Taku
River.140 In the end though, in Haida Nation, the Court determined that
the duty was met on the facts141 and again fell short of offering a more

135

Tzimas, supra, note 8, at 524.
For a more in-depth discussion on possible steps of process, see S.F. Du Toit, “Tensions
Between Human Rights and the Politics of Reconciliation: A South African Case Study” in Joanna
R. Quinn, ed., Reconciliation(s): Transitional Justice in Postconflict Societies (Montreal and
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009).
137
Slattery, “Generative Structure”, supra, note 13, sets out six Principles of Reconciliation,
which “must have the following basic features”:
(1) They should acknowledge the historical rights of aboriginal peoples, as determined by
Principles of Recognition, as the essential starting point for any modern settlement.
(2) They should take account of how historical aboriginal rights have been affected by
changes in the circumstances of indigenous peoples and the rise of third-party and
other social interests.
(3) Where appropriate, they should distinguish between the “inner core” of aboriginal
rights, which may be implemented by the courts without need for negotiation, and a
“penumbra” or “outer range” that needs to be defined in treaties negotiated between
the aboriginal people concerned and the Crown.
(4) They should provide guidelines governing the accommodation of rights and interests
held by other affected groups, both aboriginal and non-aboriginal.
(5) Where appropriate, they should create strong incentives for negotiated settlements to
be reached within a reasonable period of time.
(6) They should provide for judicial remedies where negotiations fail to yield a settlement.
138
Corbiere, supra, note 24.
139
Haida Nation, supra, note 16, at para.16.
140
Taku River, supra, note 16.
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Newman, supra, note 3, at 475-91.
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level playing field suitable for equals.142 Declaring that the Crown’s duty
to consult with Aboriginal people continues beyond what was written in
a treaty and that the duty is ongoing helps in establishing the enduring
nature of the relationship between Aboriginal people and the Crown. In
short, through consultation comes the context which was so important in
the subsequent interpretation of the Royal Proclamation, but which has
been ignored.
Moreover, these cases confirm that the Crown has a constitutionally
entrenched duty to consult with Aboriginal people.143 If we are to share the
bounty and reconcile long-standing disputes, consultation is the means by
which this process will happen. Consultation must be engaged in by the
Crown for the benefit of the long-term life of the relationship and consider
the way that practices and material conditions will shift during the life of
the parties and agreements. The interpretation of the Aboriginal
perspective must be done in a generative way that ultimately allows for
Aboriginal rights to operate “on two levels – the first, abstract and
timeless; the second concrete and timebound”.144 In this way, the Crown’s
consultative approach must be inclusive of Aboriginal perspectives,
eschew hierarchy and establish trust. With trust comes the possibility of a
reordered relationship of equals, a nation-to-nation relationship.
Though the case was dismissed on procedural grounds, the Court
signalled in obiter in Behn v. Moulton Contracting Ltd.145 its interest in
defining Aboriginal collective and individual rights — such as who has
142
In Haida Nation, supra, note 16, the Court was not prepared to rebalance the power between
Aboriginal people and the Crown. Further by finding Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation held no veto
power and in Taku River, the Court was expressly clear that the duty to consult does not carry a veto
power for Aboriginal people. Unfortunately, this leaves the relationship very one-sided in favour of the
Crown who may in the end proceed at will with at best a delay by Aboriginal concerns.
143
Slattery, “Generative Structure”, supra, note 13, at 437.
144
Id., at 443.
145
Behn v. Moulton Contracting Ltd., [2013] S.C.J. No. 26, 2013 SCC 26 (S.C.C.) sends out
an invitation that the doctrine of honour and the duty to consult as it relates to Aboriginal
peoples’ collective rights may be tightly intertwined. Writing for a unanimous Court, LeBel J. stated
(at paras. 32 and 33):
The Behns also challenge the legality of the Authorizations on the basis that they breach
their rights to hunt and trap under Treaty No. 8. This is an important issue, but a definitive
pronouncement in this regard cannot be made in the circumstances of this case. I would
caution against doing so at this stage of the proceedings and of the development of the law.
... It is true that Aboriginal and treaty rights are collective in nature … However, certain
rights, despite being held by the Aboriginal community, are nonetheless exercised by
individual members or assigned to them. These rights may therefore have both collective
and individual aspects. Individual members of a community may have a vested interest in
the protection of these rights. It may well be that, in appropriate circumstances, individual
members can assert certain Aboriginal or treaty rights. ...
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the legal right to bring a claim on behalf of an Aboriginal community or
who may assert an Aboriginal right. In the context of reconciliation, this
invitation should be well heeded by all concerned. Based on the Court’s
leanings, there is a real risk of future restrictions — exclusion even — as
to whom the Court views as having the right to determine the rules of
any One Dish-style agreement.146 Reconciliation will be elusive if not all
Aboriginal groups are able to participate in a consultative process meant
to draw everyone in.147 How collective and individual rights may be held
and who may assert them is a sensitive issue for Aboriginal people, who
continuously reject the limitations already imposed by Crown
sovereignty, whether acquired or de facto or de jure,148 and may be best
answered generously, if at all, to avoid additional potential to splinter
relations.
Both “honour” and “consultation” have been used as a justification
for diminishing Aboriginal and treaty rights in favour of Crown
sovereignty. If reconciliation really matters, then manipulating honour
and consultation to subvert Aboriginal rights in favour of the settler
population cannot continue. Instead, these elements should be recast in
keeping with the example the Haudenosaunee and Anishinabe offer with
One Dish and should be used not as a vehicle to uphold a colonial myth
of sovereignty, but rather as a means to equalize the parties and set the
relationship right.
3. Restraint
Another key principle of One Dish revolves around the question of
restraint. Had either the Anishinabe or Haudenosaunee opted to take
more than their share, the bowl would have tipped and equilibrium
would have been lost. This may pose a greater challenge to the Crown,
which continues to rely on a hierarchical ordering of rights, with Crown
supremacy to be the basis for legal argument as we have seen in
Sparrow and reflected throughout section 35(1) jurisprudence. Again,
the Manitoba Metis decision, wherein the Crown is called out for
146
The use of a common bowl metaphor is also used in other ways relating to sharing
by the Nisga’a. For more on this, see H. Foster, H. Raven & J. Webber, eds., Right Be
Done: Aboriginal Title, the Calder Case, and the Future of Indigenous Rights (Vancouver:
UBC Press, 2011), at 220.
147
M. Walters, supra, note 5, at 180.
148
For more on de facto versus de jure Crown sovereignty, see Slattery, “Generative
Structure”, supra, note 13.
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failing to uphold the doctrine of honour, indicates that the passage of
time will not bar future claims, meaning that there should be interest by
the Crown in finding new ways forward. It is more effective for the
Crown to manage its own restraint149 and not to take too much from
already strained relationships, rather than waiting for legal claims, which
may be brought at any time, to challenge the Crown taking more than it
should.
Aboriginal laws are instructive in achieving restraint “through
intersocietal activities between First Nations to bridge division and
discord”.150 Take the Haudenosaunee, for example, who pre-contact had
laws and protocols in place in the event of a threat to resources or
lands.151 Such means included “wider systems of diplomacy”152 and
intersocietal norms153 that functioned as preventative measures meant to
demonstrate restraint and avoid harm. The Anishinabe made use of
“peace-keeping warriors, or Ogijidah … to patrol and monitor such sites
of conflict, and perhaps even occupy a contested site. … These tools
were embedded in a wider framework of law.”154 In this way, the parties
to One Dish teach us about achieving restraint through proactive means
rather than waiting for conflict to erupt and accessing a colonial legal
system for post-conflict redress.
4. Maintenance
Finally, the regular renewal of One Dish between the Anishinabe and
the Haudenosaunee contributed considerably to its ongoing success. By
gathering together regularly and sharing the very bounty subject to One
Dish, the two Nations were able to reaffirm the preceding three elements
along with the solemnity of One Dish155 and transmit One Dish’s
importance to younger generations. The Court understands this in
J. Borrows, “Indian Agency and Taking What’s Not Yours” (2003) 22 Windsor Y.B.
Access Just. 253.
150
Borrows, Indigenous Constitution, supra, note 26, at 130.
151
Y. Richmond, D. Richter & J.H. Merrell, Beyond the Covenant Chain: The Iroquois and
Their Neighbors in Indian North America, 1600-1800 (University Park, PA: Penn State University
Press, 2003) [hereinafter “Beyond the Covenant Chain”].
152
Borrows, Indigenous Constitution, supra, note 26, at 130.
153
Webber, supra, note 88.
154
Borrows, Indigenous Constitution, supra, note 26.
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O. Lyons, “Spirituality, Equality, and Natural Law” in L. Little Bear, M. Boldt & J.A.
Long, eds., Pathways to Self-Determination: Canadian Indians and the Canadian State (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1984), at 5-6 [hereinafter “Lyons”].
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identifying ongoing maintenance as a requirement for successful
relationships. In Little Salmon/Carmacks and Quebec (Attorney General)
v. Moses, the Court held that treaties — including so-called modern ones
— require ongoing maintenance to avoid disagreement.156 In Mikisew
Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage),157 the
Court tells us that even the pre-Confederation treaties must be
continuously renewed:
... Treaty making is an important stage in the long process of
reconciliation, but is it only a stage. What occurred at Fort Chipewyan
in 1899 was not the complete discharge of the duty arising from the
honour of the Crown but a rededication of it.
...
In summary, the 1899 negotiations [for Treaty 8] were the first step in a
long journey that is unlikely to end any time soon. ... 158

The element of maintenance was vitally important from an
Aboriginal perspective at the Treaty of Niagara insofar as spirituality is
infused into sacred agreements.159 In particular, “the primary law of
Indian government is the spiritual law ... our spirituality is directly
involved in government … [s]o we are told first to conduct the
ceremonies on time, in the proper manner, and then sit in council.”160
The British Crown committed to “entering into treaties with Indigenous
peoples if their lands were to be occupied by non-Aboriginal people.
Indigenous peoples’ actions and perspectives were important to this
policy formulation.”161 Subsequently, treaty negotiations were complex,
involved and accompanied by diplomatic rules established by
Aboriginal people. The Crown had to follow the rules or risk further
fighting.162 At the formulation of the Covenant Chain of Friendship, 163
responsibilities were assigned, rules established and “a multinational
156

Little Salmon/Carmacks, supra, note 89, at para. 46, and Quebec (Attorney General) v.
Moses, [2010] S.C.J. No. 17, 2010 SCC 17, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 557, at para. 61 (S.C.C.).
157
[2005] S.C.J. No. 71, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 388 (S.C.C.).
158
Id., at paras. 54 and 56.
159
Borrows, Indigenous Constitution, supra, note 26, at 161.
160
Lyons, supra, note 155, at 5-6.
161
Borrows, Indigenous Constitution, supra, note 26, at 133.
162
Id., at 158, wherein he notes that the Crown’s failure to follow diplomatic protocol and
exchange gifts during treaty negotiations resulted in Pontiac resuming fighting in 1764.
163
R.L. Haan, “Covenant and Consensus, Iroquois and English, 1676-1760” in Beyond the
Covenant Chain, supra, note 151, at 41. Also note that the Covenant Chain of Friendship formed
part of the Treaty of Niagara.
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alliance in which no member gave up their sovereignty, was affirmed.
The Royal Proclamation became a treaty.”164 Through the Covenant
Chain of Friendship, wampum was given,165 just as it was with One Dish.
Moreover, the Anishinabe and Haudenosaunee gathered together at timed
intervals to participate in ceremony and transmit the laws of One Dish to
all in attendance so that the treaty would continue to be respected and
peace would continue to reign.166 Maintenance then, is the means by
which the relationship continues to thrive in the long term. For the
Crown and Aboriginal people this may possibly take the form of annual
meetings that involve ceremony, the exchange of gifts and discussions
that seek to reaffirm the relationship and address concerns arising in a
modern context.167

V. FINDING A WAY ... TOGETHER
“[W]e are all here to stay.”168 The relationship between the Crown
and Aboriginal people can only be reconciled by also taking Indigenous
approaches to law169 into account.170 The Royal Commission on
Aboriginal Peoples171 considered this question in an intersocietal law
paradigm and suggested a new Royal Proclamation, one that creates a
path forward to a new relationship and corrects the historical record —
one that is more in keeping with both Crown and Aboriginal perspectives
originally folded into the Treaty of Niagara. The Treaty included both an
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Borrows, Indigenous Constitution, supra, note 26, at 161.
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Corbiere, supra, note 24.
167
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, supra, note 30, Laying the Foundations of a
New Relationship, Vol. 5, makes a number of recommendations toward restructuring the relationship
for the long term.
168
Delgamuukw, supra, note 12, at para. 186.
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For more on Indigenous approaches to law as sacred, see H. Cardinal & W. Hildebandt,
Treaty Elders of Saskatchewan: Our Dream Is That Our Peoples Will One Day Be Clearly
Recognized as Nations (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2000).
170
R. Dworkin, Justice in Robes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006). Dworkin
suggests that both existing jurisprudence and its moral soundness are two fundamental elements
of a decision’s fit within an overall legal landscape. With the Court’s reliance on a colonialist
structure — and thereby morally suspect — considering Dworkin’s approach, reconciliation may
not be achieved without a considerable change in law and a more morally sound approach, such
as respecting Aboriginal people’s own laws (which was also at issue in the Tsilhqot’in case,
supra, note 55).
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Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, supra, note 30, Vol. 5, Renewal: A Twenty-Year
Commitment.
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English written text of the Royal Proclamation, 1763 and a wampum belt
that were intended to be read together. For this new venture to succeed,
there must be a “rejection of the doctrine of discovery”172 on the grounds
that it is “legally, morally and factually wrong”.173
If One Dish is a worthy means of recasting the relationship and a
model of how to go about achieving reconciliation, the courts and the
ideology of One Dish are not entirely oppositional. Jointly, they offer a
common starting point with honour and a consultative process, if used
effectively and fully in negotiations, that takes both sides into account to
create something new. One Dish offers one option to reconcile the
relationship by reshaping it from vertical to horizontal, unbalanced to
equal, acrimonious to harmonized, hierarchical to circular. In other
words, One Dish, and its ongoing maintenance, may make the
relationships flexible enough to accommodate everyone for the long
term. It asks us to expand our legal imagination to make room174 as we
gather together at one table, share one bounty and take what we need, no
more, no less. One Dish’s elements are in keeping with Court doctrine
and are broad enough to allow for a more cohesive view of reconciliation
that may replace frustration with assumed Crown sovereign authority
with trust. One Dish does not require either the Crown or Aboriginal
people to entirely reinvent themselves; but rather, recasts what is meant
by reconciliation, and allows for a drawing together to build an
agreement that will govern a relationship where the parties are not
separate but equal, but rather, equal and together.
Reconciliation is more than just a notional idea. What the Chief
Justice is stating, through defining reconciliation as a key objective of
section 35, is a principle also fundamental to One Dish. The relationship
between Canada and Aboriginal people is ongoing and must be tended.
There should not ever be a time when the relationship closes.175 One
Dish supports the definition of “reconciliation as relationship” approach
offered by Walters. It is about cooperation, balance, equality and respect.
Much has happened in the Court to define Aboriginal constitutional
rights as the Court cuts a wide, seemingly meandering path, towards
Borrows, “(Ab)Originalism”, supra, note 9, at 370.
Id.; see also Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, supra, note 30, Vol. 1, at 696.
174
Macklem, “First Nations Self-Government, supra, note 98. The author argues for the
need to reconceptualize Anglo-Canadian norms, legal principles and assumptions that have colluded
to create a structure that limits the legal imagination with respect to the relationship between the
Crown and Aboriginal People. I posit that One Dish presents such a reconceptualization.
175
Haida Nation, supra, note 16, at para 54.
172
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(as the Court claims), reconciliation.176 The jurisprudence indicates that the
Court has done some lifting, but is it enough? The enduring acceptance of
Crown sovereign authority in section 35 jurisprudence to date will
continue to destabilize efforts177 to negotiate agreements intended to pave
the way to reconciliation. Similarly, as we have seen, the Court has not
developed a clear process that operationalizes the reconciliation purpose of
section 35(1), and can be relied upon for smoothing out relations.178 Yet,
constitutions are supposed to assist people in making sound decisions about
how they will live together within a shared territory.179 For the relationship
to work, a new approach is required,180 one that allows constitutional space
for “aboriginal people to be aboriginal”.181 Presently, the law is decided by
judges at a nine-sided table without a single Aboriginal jurist in sight. Can
such a court be ready to consider alternatives and broaden the meaning of
reconciliation so that it works for Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians
alike?182 Given the state of the relationship and the Chief Justice’s priority
for the Court, a different approach should be welcomed.
In the end, when it comes to reconciliation, it is helpful to recall that
the relationship has been going on for centuries and is a long game.
Through discussion, negotiation and even arguments, we will find our
way to reconciliation so long as we come together to share with purpose.
If we do anything less, the original dispossession of Aboriginal people
through the simple acceptance of Crown sovereignty and a lopsided
approach to section 35, is something everyone should be afraid of.
Through open, level and fair negotiations, as the Court suggests, Canada
has a chance to come into its own. In all of these pursuits, some hope can
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interactions over time, in other words, a long game.
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be found in the jurisprudence, which when combined with One Dish, has
much to offer to intersocietal law that at its best will endure.
Living in Anishinabe territory, I have been taught not only to give
thanks for the food we eat, but also to end thanksgiving with the words
“all my relations”. This phrase serves as a gentle reminder of our place in
the world and how we are inextricably linked to all life around us. It is
meant to confirm, whether we care to admit it or not, that we all sit at one
table, share one bowl and eat together with one spoon. It is beneficial for
all concerned that sooner, not later, we find a way to reconcile the
relationship between Canada and Aboriginal people in a way that is
meaningful to all parties and to make it work. After all, we are bound up
in a long game and have to get through this together. Let us face it, we
are all here to stay. All my relations.

